Wagist

The Drawbridge of Central Asia

Posted on October 12, 2009 by Alex Halpern

Since its founding as a modern state in 1738, Afghanistan has served as both a bridge between Asia and the Middle East and, owing to its geographic location, a strategic outpost for many of the world’s armies. Sitting between Pakistan and Iran, Afghanistan can either serve as a moderating influence on those countries or it can further destabilize them both. With nuclear weapons on one side and the potential for more on the other, Afghanistan has never been more important on the world stage.

The American mission, Operation Enduring Freedom, has been an endurance to say the least. As we approach the eighth anniversary of our first military operations there, the war has gotten worse and the population less friendly. More than a half-decade of antagonism towards the Muslim world has left the forces on the ground there occupying and failing to pacify a nation that has become even more hostile than it was when the war first began. The American-installed government is more corrupt than even the Iraqi government and Coalition forces hold little land outside of the cities. The recent offensive in Helmand Province and the increased efforts to involve local villages and tribes in their own security are good first steps but in order to truly stem the re-expansion of the Taliban, more troops and a stronger NATO will are necessary.

In President Obama’s speech of March 27, 2009, he outlined a new strategy for the war in Afghanistan. A larger force, with a focus on securing the border with Pakistan and not allowing militants to stream back and forth among the two countries and increased effort to improve domestic life for the Afghani people were among his main priorities. He also called for more support from NATO allies and for an investment in stabilizing the Pakistani government. These efforts, while on the right path, fall far short of an plan that could bring about real change while setting a withdrawal date for American and Coalition forces.

There is no end game in Afghanistan, no hope for a quick and easy fix, as demonstrated by the eight years, billions of dollars and nearly 1,500 Coalition killed and another 5,000 wounded. These numbers will all continue to climb, particularly the casualty rates, if our current strategy is pursued. Taliban forces have only become more aggressive since Obama unveiled his strategy and there are no signs that things on the ground can be described as anything but dismal. Afghanistan is vital to American and global security. Stop-gap measures like adding a few Marine brigades will not bring the Coalition forces any closer to a scenario anyone could describe as a victory.

So what is the answer? During his Presidential campaign John McCain was quoted as saying that he could foresee an American presence in Iraq for 100 years and was rightly vilified for it. What wasn’t talked about, however, was the sad reality of the rest of his comment.

“As long as Americans are not being injured or harmed or wounded or killed, it’s fine with me and I hope it would be fine with you if we maintain a presence in a very volatile part of the world where al Qaeda is training, recruiting, equipping and motivating people every single day.”

While a fallacy when applied to Iraq, this may prove to be the necessary attitude towards Afghanistan. Unless the United States and NATO are willing to utilize the necessary force to truly wipe out the Taliban, highly unlikely given the current economic state of America and the lack of popular support for a wider, more aggressive war, it may well be that the United States and Europe are engaged in Afghanistan for a hundred years. There is no viable exit strategy until the Taliban has been rooted out and reduced to a force no longer able to act on the political or military level in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The only alternative short of waging a war that while vital is impossible is a continued presence on the ground, slowly bleeding both their forces and ours until one side runs out of troops and equipment. While the Coalition forces may kill far more Taliban forces than they themselves lose, without proper reconstruction and outreach every bomb dropped creates twenty new Taliban recruits.

We are faced with an impossible decision in a country that nearly every world power has tried and failed to conquer. Empires have been lost in the mountains of Afghanistan. There is no end to a war in Afghanistan if the wrong amount of force is applied. Only an eventual slow withdrawal, helicopters leaving crumbling bases and angry natives behind. We can commit the resources necessary or we can watch as our children are sent off to fight in Afghanistan and their children after them. Dim prospects both.